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Abstract. Neurosciences are progressively moving into a mass computational 
intensive era with the fusion of numerous large heterogeneous data sets from 
cellular to system level. To process and share this mass of information in a 
consistent and computational amenable form, computerized techniques – among 
them, ontologies - are currently designed to store, analyze and access this 
information. Recently, we proposed a multi-layered and multi-components 
ontology to deal with MR images and regions-of-interest that can be represented 
onto the images. In the present paper, we extend our initial ontology by adding a 
core ontology of subject data acquisition instruments modeling neuroclinical,
neuropsychological and neurobehavioral tests used for neurological, behavioral 
and cognitive skills assessment. This ontology deals with instruments per se as 
specific artefacts, their variables and measured scores, and actions performed 
using instruments. In the paper, we underline the major aspects of our approach 
and emphasize its potential interest as a semantic reference for various
neuroscience applications.
Keywords. Biomedical ontology, Artefact ontology, Knowledge Representation, 
Neuroscience, Brain
Introduction
Similarly to other biomedical scientists, neuroscientists collect facts, use knowledge 
(what they currently know about these facts) and then make inferences to produce new 
knowledge and facts [4]. As a consequence, there is a crucial need for computerized 
techniques to store, manage, analyze and share this information [1][36]. Alike 
bioinformatics with in silico experiments [33], neuroscience is progressively moving 
into a mass computational intensive era with fusion of various large heterogeneous data 
sets from cellular to system level [23]. These datasets are often disseminated in various 
medical centers and carried out in highly distributed environments such as grids 
[31][36]. Many research groups in various institutions make strong efforts to develop 
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federated and distributed infrastructures for biomedical imaging data [2][14][18]. To 
process the mass of information in a consistent and computational amenable form, 
ontologies have become recently very important in neurosciences [19][34]. The 
prominent effort in this direction is currently done via the Biomedical Informatics 
Research Network (BIRN) which proposes, based on an ontology-based vocabulary 
called BIRNLex a unified representation of the biomedical domains typically used to 
describe neuroscience data [5]. This ontological effort is driven by the OBO (Open 
Biomedical Ontologies) initiative that promotes shared biomedical ontologies[32].
In Neuroscience, imaging plays a central role providing information about brain 
structure and function. Among the different imaging modalities, Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) strongly contributes to studying the healthy and the pathological brain, 
from both anatomical and functional perspectives and appears as the cornerstone of 
most cognitive studies [22]. In parallel with MRI images, questionnaires and batteries 
of tests are currently used to assess the neurological state of the subjects as well as their 
cognitive and behavioural performances. All these instruments focus on specific brain 
functions, which rely on specific anatomical structures or pathways, so they can be 
used in diagnosing brain dysfunction or damage and measuring intensity/severity of a 
subject’s trait (e.g. behavioral, personality, psychological, psychopathological) [21].
Such tests and questionnaire-based interviews are complementary to MR images to 
investigate the correlation between measures of brain structure and function, derived 
from MR image analysis, and neurological, cognitive and behavioural traits, 
highlighted by test- and questionnaire-based assessments [9].
Recently, we proposed a multi-layered ontology (named OntoNeuroLOG) to deal 
with MR images and regions-of-interest that can be represented onto the images [34].
In the present paper, we extend our initial ontology by adding a new component to 
model the general characteristics of the neuroclinical, neuropsychological and 
behavioral tests and scores mostly used. To our knowledge, this significant effort 
represents the first attempt to model this kind of data. This core ontology is currently 
specialized for sharing data between four French neuroimaging centres through the 
federated NeuroLOG architecture
2
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we remind of the most 
generic modules of OntoNeuroLOG onto which our Instrument ontology relies, 
especially the foundational ontology DOLCE
, leading to the conceptualization of specific classes 
of instruments.
3
[17]
and a formal ontology of artefacts 
recently designed . We then detail our main contribution, an ontology of subject 
data acquisition instruments, including instruments per se as specific technical artefacts, 
with their variables and scores associated, and actions performed using an instrument. 
In the Discussion section we underline the major aspects of our approach and 
emphasize in Conclusion its potential interest as a semantic reference for various 
neurosciences applications.
1. Methods: Our ontological reference framework
To define the OntoNeuroLOG ontology, we adopted a multi-layer and multi-
components approach [35]. OntoNeuroLOG is organized into sub-ontologies (modules) 
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with different levels of abstraction. Schematically, three levels can be identified: at the 
most abstract level, the foundational DOLCE ontology [24] provides a set of abstract 
concepts (e.g. physical object, event, quality) and relations (e.g. parthood, constitution)
for structuring (by specialization) any type of domain. At this level, DOLCE is 
supplemented by a few ontologies such as a formal ontology of artefacts [17]. At an 
intermediate level, “core” domain ontologies [12] define generic and central concepts 
in various domains such as medical images [34] or programs and software [20]. Lastly, 
at the most specific level, the previously mentioned ontologies are then specialized to 
define more specific concepts in the field of neuroimaging and image processing tools, 
respectively.
We adopt two different modeling languages for specifying our ontologies. At a 
developmental stage, modeling choices are specified – in the context of OntoSpec 
methodology [16] – by means of a semi-informal language which is semantically rich 
and includes temporally-indexed relations and meta-properties of the OntoClean 
methodology [13]. At run-time, the ontologies are encoded in a dialect of OWL –
OWL-Lite augmented with rules – which is semantically much poorer than the former 
but allows for effective automatic inferences (the semantic search engine Corese [8] is 
currently used within the NeuroLOG project).
The new ontology of subject data acquisition instruments is situated at the 
intermediate level of core ontologies. Its definition relies on abstract primitives 
provided by generic ontologies (a list of these modules is presented in Table 1). 
Furthermore, it is used to model classes of specialized instruments (e.g. neuroclinical 
and neuropsychological instruments) which correspond to “domain” ontologies. 
In the following part of this section, we remind of the main structuring principles 
and concepts provided by the modules of Table 1. 
Table 1. Domains covered by most generic modules composing OntoNeuroLOG, along with the location of 
their OntoSpec manifestation (prefix=http://www.laria.u-picardie.fr/IC/Site/IMG/pdf)
Module domains Location of OntoSpec 
manifestation
Particular Endurant, perdurant, quality, 
abstract
prefix/Particular-OS.pdf
Action Deliberate action, intentional 
action, physical action, 
conceptual action
prefix/Action-OS.pdf
Participant role Agent, substrate, consequent, 
result, instrument
prefix/Participant-role-OS.pdf
Function & artefact Artificial object, functional 
object, artefact, technical 
artifact, social artefact
prefix/Function-artefact-OS.pdf
Inscription & Expression & 
Conceptualization
Support, inscription, Linguistic 
expression,  concept, proposition
prefix/Inscription-OS.pdf
1.1 DOLCE
DOLCE’s domain is that of Particulars
4
4
With respect to our notation, the informal labels on DOLCE’s categories appear in the text in the 
Courrier new font with First Capital Letters for the concepts and a javaLikeNotation
for relations. The same conventions apply for all the ontologies presented in the paper.
, that is to say entities that cannot be 
instantiated (e.g. “my car”) rather than universals (e.g. “being a car”). Four sub-
domains of Particulars are distinguished (see Fig. 1):
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x Endurants are entities “enduring in time”5
x Perdurants are entities “occurring in time” (e.g. your reading of this article) 
in which Endurants temporarily participate.
. Within Endurants, Physical
Objects (e.g. a printed copy of an article) are distinguished from Non-
Physical Objects (e.g. the contents of this article), this distinction 
corresponding to a difference between two realities or modes of existence for 
the entities. Basically, Non-Physical Objects exist insofar as agents speak 
about them. The domain of Non-Physical Objects covers entities whose 
existence depends on either an individual (for Mental Objects) or a 
community of agents (for Social Objects).
x Endurants and Perdurants have Qualities that we perceive and/or 
measure (e.g. the weight of the printed copy of an article, the time it takes for 
you to read this article). Note that these Qualities are inherent to the entity 
that bears them, since they are characteristic for it and they are present 
throughout the course of the entity’s existence.
x Qualities take “values”, called Quales (e.g. 25 grams, 20 minutes) within 
quality region spaces.
Figure 1. An excerpt of DOLCE’s hierarchy of concepts. A solid line between two concepts represents a 
direct subsumption link. A dashed line reflects the existence of intermediate concepts. A line between two 
lines indicates that sibling concepts are incompatible
As a complement to DOLCE, our “Participation role” module specializes the 
participation relation to account for specific ways in which Endurants
temporally participate in Perdurants (e.g. isAgentOfAt, isInstrumentOfAt,
isResultOfAt) and such relations, in turn, are used to define participation roles
specializing the concept Endurant (e.g. Agent, Instrument, Result).
Within the domain of Perdurants, Actions have been informally introduced 
into DOLCE-Lite-Plus as Accomplishments that “exemplify the intentionality of an 
agent” [24]. With the aim of conceptualizing the notion of artefact and subsequently 
the notion of subject data acquisition instrument, we introduced two specializations of 
these Actions. These specializations rely on a distinction between two kinds of 
intentions.
Following on from Searle [30], contemporary philosophers distinguish between 
two overall kinds of intention – a “prior intention” and “intention-in-action”, to borrow 
5
Due to space limitations, we are only able to provide a very brief characterization of DOLCE’s 
categories and we limit ourselves to categories of use in our ontology of instruments. 
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Searle’s terms – which differ according to their temporality, role and content [27]. A 
prior intention consists in planning an action (prior to the realization of the action) and 
then rationally controlling the action. It relies on a conceptual representation of the type 
of action to be performed, comprising an objective (i.e. a goal) and, optionally, a means 
of achieving it (i.e. a plan). Once the action has been initiated, the intention-in-action
consists in the continuous guidance and control of the initiated action by relying on a 
descriptive, context-sensitive representation of the said action.
Taking into account current knowledge on the phenomenology of actions [28], we 
first assimilate Actions to processes controlled by an intention (intention-in-action 
and/or prior intention); these contrast with Happenings which lack an intentional 
cause. We then introduce two specializations of Actions. Firstly, Deliberate 
Actions are initiated by a prior intention comprising a conceptual representation of 
the intended goal. Secondly, within Deliberate Actions, Successful Actions
are carried out to completion and lead to their intended result.
1.2 I&DA
I&DA is a core ontology in the domain of information content entities and their 
physical materialization that was initially built for classifying documents by their 
contents [11]. I&DA extends DOLCE by introducing three main types of entities (see 
Fig. 2):
x Inscriptions (e.g. printed texts) are knowledge forms materialized by a 
substance (e.g. ink) and inscribed on a physical support (e.g. a sheet of paper, 
a hard disk). The peculiarity of these Physical Endurants lies in their 
intentional nature: Inscriptions count as other entities, Expressions.
x Expressions (e.g. texts, logical formulae) are non-physical knowledge 
forms ordered by a communication language. Inscriptions realize 
Expressions and, like Inscriptions, Expressions are intentional 
entities conveying contents for agents.
x Conceptualizations consist of the ultimate means by which agents can 
reason about a world. Two kinds of Conceptualizations are distinguished: 
Propositions, as a means of describing a state of affairs; and Concepts, as 
a means to classify entities. Note that, as for the practical semiotics introduced 
in the ontology SUMO [29], Propositions may encompass the content 
expressed by sentences, theories, books, and even libraries.
Figure 2. An excerpt of I&DA’s hierarchy of concepts
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We are going to see (in Section 3) that Propositions and Concepts correspond 
to the intrinsic nature of our instruments. Before that, we extend DOLCE in another 
way to account for the intentional nature of these instruments and their function.
1.3 Artefacts
The notion of artefact that we adopt elaborates on the common philosophical notion of 
an “entity intentionally made or produced for some reason” [15]. Analyzing the notions 
of intention and reason, this leads us to identify different classes of entities we find 
important to clearly distinguish and define [17] (see Fig. 3):
x Firstly, we contrast entities resulting from an action of production 
(Producing Consequents) with entities that are not intentionally produced 
(Happening Consequents). Among the latter figure Experimental
Artefacts (which are unwanted results).
x Secondly, according to whether the intention of production is a prior intention 
or not, Artefacts are distinguished from Non-Targeted Objects (the 
latter result from Non-Deliberate Actions of production, e.g. routines).
x Thirdly, different kinds of reasons for producing Artefacts (hence different 
kinds of Artefacts) are considered: (i) conveying an emotion and being of 
aesthetic interest, for works of art, (ii) enabling their author (or another agent) 
to do something, for “functional” or Technical Artefacts. The latter are 
Artefacts to which a Function is ascribed, taking a Function to be an 
“acknowledged capacity to enable the realization of a kind of action” [17].
It is important to note that DOLCE’s distinction between Physical and Non-
Physical Objects transcends the domain of Artefacts. Indeed, the latter are 
defined by the origin of their existence (i.e. their intentional production) rather than a 
mode of existence. This difference explains why we are able to distinguish between 
physical artefacts (e.g. an oscilloscope, an image acquisition equipment) and non-
physical artefacts (e.g. the content of an article, a subject data acquisition instrument).
To sum up, Technical Artefacts have – at least – a triple nature as entities (i) 
possessing an internal essence (be it physical, social or cognitive), (ii) having been 
intentionally (and successfully) produced, and (iii) having necessarily a Function.
Figure 3. Core taxonomy of artefacts
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With the modules presented in this section in hand, we now have at our disposal a 
minimal set of conceptual primitives which enables us to tackle the modeling of the 
domain of neurological, neuropsychological and behavioral instruments.
2. Our core ontology of instruments
In the core ontology we propose, instruments per se are considered as specific technical
artefacts, with their own variables and scores associated, and actions performed using 
an instrument as specific conceptual actions.
2.1. Instrument-based assessments
An Instrument-Based Assessment action corresponds to an administration of an 
instrument or a ‘testing’ (to use the term recommended by [7]). The conceptualization 
of this action plays a pivotal role, linking together a large number of entities (cf. Fig. 
4): a Healthcare Professional (for instance clinical neuropsychologist or 
neurologist), as Agent; the Subject about whom data are acquired and, more widely, 
the context in which this acquisition is performed (i.e. an Examination within a 
Study); the used instrument prescribing which data are to be acquired and how; results 
obtained following questions raised and/or tests performed.
These actions commonly take two forms according to whether they solicit an 
authentic production from the Subject (e.g., a reflex, a performance such as drawing, 
or a 500-meter walk), for Test-Based Assessments, or they consist in an interview, 
an inventory, for Questionnaire-Based Assessments. Assessments are then 
specialized according to the type of acquired data (e.g., psychological, behavioral, 
neuroclinical), mirroring in part the instruments taxonomy (cf. Fig. 5). The raison 
d’être of this specialization is to take into account specifications of the evidence of 
competence (knowledge, skills, abilities, specialties) that would be expected from 
someone seeking qualification as a test user.
Figure 4. Taxonomy of Instrument-based assessments.
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2.2. Subject data acquisition instruments
The instruments used to evaluate the state of subjects clearly are technical artefacts. For 
their conceptualization, we follow our theory of the threefold nature of technical
artefacts [17]. This prompts to describe them as being:
x Intangible artefacts, i.e. propositional contents including “clearly defined 
methods and instructions for administration or responding, a standard format 
for data collection, and well-documented methods for scoring, analysis, and 
interpretation of results” [6].
x Technical artefacts allowing to explore entities related to the state of the 
subject – these categories of entities correspond to the Domain(s) of the 
instrument.
x Social artefacts intentionally created, adopted for use, then adapted and 
maintained by a community ascribing them the status of standard.
As the definition adopted from [6] indicates, we are faced to complex propositional 
contents. As an illustration of this complexity, some Instruments are explicitly
composed of Sub-instruments exploring sub- or related domains (see Fig. 5). For 
example, to explore the multidimensional aspect of memory, the General Memory 
Index of the Wechlser Memory Scale-III (WMS-III) - a composite instrument designed 
to explore several memory abilities - is based on the delayed recall performances 
of several core “memory” tests, like the Visual Memory Test or the Verbal Memory
Test [37]. Such a composition is also found for Instruments which assess a restricted 
set of cognitive functions. For example, the Mini-Mental State (MMS) [10], which is 
probably the most widely used instrument for dementia [21], is structured according to 
a set of several items such as the MMS Orientation Test, the MMS Registration Test or 
the MMS Language Tests. Moreover the MMS Language Tests consist of several items 
such as the MMS Oral Order Language Test or the MMS Written Order Language Test.
This indicates that even an Instrument which addresses a relatively small domain 
may be structurally complex. Such a structure is important to model because, according 
to the context, only some parts of an instrument may be administrated. 
The effects of brain disorders being rarely confined to a single behavioral 
dimension or functional system [21], Instrument-Based Assessments focus on
different issues: neurological disorders (e.g. weakness, stiffness or visual impairments), 
cognitive impairments (e.g. aphasia, failure of judgment, lapse of memory), and other 
behavioral disorders (e.g. personality change, reduced mental efficiency or depression). 
Functionally, Instruments explore entities (their Domain(s)) which are of different 
ontological nature (e.g., states, abilities, cognitive functions, behaviors). For instance 
the memory is a cognitive function, while the depression is a Subject's pathological 
state. Moreover, an Instrument can be designed to explore one or several domains
(Mono-domain vs Multi-domain Instrument). Generally, the goal with a 
Multi-domain Instrument is to integrate into one index the scores obtained by the 
patient while exploring different dimensions or functional systems. For instance, the 
MMS, which addresses the Global Cognitive efficiency, tries to obtain a global 
measure while exploring a whole set of domains: orientation, calculation, language, 
memory, praxia. Formally, a Domain is modeled as an individual concept which 
classifies classes of entities.
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Figure 5. Taxonomy of Subject data acquisition instruments.
2.3. Instrument variables
Instrument variables are themselves Subject data acquisition 
artefacts. They carry two fundamental characteristics of the related instrument. First, 
they define what is being explored and measured using this instrument, represented by 
an explored Domain and a measured Quality, respectively. A distinction is introduced 
between Main variables, which explore the same Domain as the related instrument 
(i.e. same cognitive function or trait of the subject), and Secondary variables,
which provide complementary information.  Variables may also be categorized as 
Sex dependent variables, Age dependent variables, and Cultural skill 
dependent variables. When, for a variable, a typical value from a population of 
reference is available, the measured value can be standardized and stored in the 
corresponding score associated to the variable. 
Second, Instrument variables define the range of allowed score values, with 
a basic distinction between Coded variables, which register Coded scores, and 
Numerical variables that register Numerical scores. The former are associated 
to a set of allowed Coded variable values, which are parts of the definition of the 
instrument. The latter, Numerical variables, can take any value in a certain range 
(which may be specified using min and max values). For instance, the MMS 
Calculation variable is a Numerical variable belonging to the range [0;5]. The
Pessimistic thoughts variable of the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale 
(MADRS) [26] is a Coded variable with the following Coded variable values
{0 = ‘No pessimistic thoughts’, 2 = ‘Fluctuating ideas of failure, self-reproach or self-
depreciation’, 3 = ‘Persistent self-accusation, or definite but still rational ideas of guilt 
or sin. Increasingly pessimistic about the future’, 6 = ‘Delusions of ruin, remorse or 
irredeemable sin. Self-accusations, which are absurd and unshakable’}. Values are
Propositions denoting, e.g., that “the subject has no pessimistic thoughts as 
measured by the MADRS Pessimistic thoughts variable”. In the latter proposition, the 
term ‘subject’ does not refer to a particular individual, but to an abstract Subject.
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Figure 6. Taxonomy of Instrument variables.
2.4. Scores
Scores are Propositions that result from the recording of a particular Subject’s 
cognitive performance (e.g. calculation performance) or a particular Subject's trait 
intensity (e.g. pessimistic thoughts intensity) during a particular Instrument-
based assessment, in relation to a particular Instrument Variable. For 
instance a Score may correspond to the following propositions: "During one MMS 
Calculation assessment, Patient X’s Calculation performance is equal to 4 as 
measured by such MMS Calculation variable" or "During one MADRS assessment,
Patient X has no pessimistic thoughts as measured by the MADRS Pessimistic thoughts 
variable".
Scores are divided into Coded scores and Numerical scores. Coded
scores specialize the Coded variable values allowed for a particular Coded
variable by referring to a particular Subject.
Numerical scores are further categorized as Raw scores, Corrected
scores and Standardized scores depending whether they result of the direct 
registering of the subject’s performance, or result of some correction or standardization 
of such raw scores. One also distinguishes between Scores with (respectively 
without) unit of measure.
Figure 7. Taxonomy of Scores.
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2.5. Codes
We have seen that Variable values and Scores are Propositions. To help 
synthesize these values and offer calculus facilities, these Propositions are usually 
coded. Let’s take, for instance, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-III) [3], one of the 
most widely used instruments for measuring the severity of depression. One of its 
variables measures the sleeping dimension with values such as: “The patient sleeps 
somewhat more than usual” or “The patient sleeps most of the day”. These 
Propositions are both qualitatively coded (by the respective Qualitative Score 
codes: ‘Minimal’ and ‘Severe’) and quantitatively coded (by the respective 
Quantitative Score codes: ‘1a’ and ‘3a’). The latter Codes refer to a number 
(resp. 1 and 3), therefore enabling applying order relationships.
Figure 8. Taxonomy of Score codes.
3. Discussion
A central quest in current neuroscience is the understanding of relations, under 
normal or pathological conditions, between brain anatomy and brain function. Brain 
functions can be mainly explored by neuroimaging, such as functional MRI, and 
neuropsychology, when concerned with the behavioral expression of brain functions 
[19]. One of our goal, with the construction of the proposed core ontology, was to 
define a model supporting the investigation of correlations between MRI based 
findings and neuroclinical, behavioural and neuropsychological based findings. The 
latter can be assessed by scores, which register the subject’s task ability, cognitive 
performance or trait intensity. These correlations will be investigated in mining a large 
collection of data via a federation of heterogeneous and distributed databases 
(NeuroLOG project). For instance in Alzheimer's disease (AD), Gray Matter (GM) loss 
in the temporal regions lobes seems correlated with a decrease in Global Cognitive 
Efficiency (GCE) score. The two widely used instruments to examine the cognitive 
changes that characterize AD are the Mini Mental State (MMS) and the Mattis 
Dementia Rating Scale (MDRS) [25]. Indeed, MMS and MDRS are multi-domains 
instruments because their sub-instruments screen a large set of cognitive skills:
attention, orientation, calculation, language, memory, praxia. The MMS and MDRS
main variables register a total score which is based on the scores obtained during each 
of their sub-instrument assessments. Depending on the clinicians habits or the context 
of the assessment, MMS or MDRS is considered to define the subject’s GCE. 
NeuroLOG’s platform allows to search for: "all patients with a low GCE and with T1-
weigthed images presenting a GM loss temporal lobes ". Firstly, our core ontology
allows (i) to retrieve all the Instruments (and their Main variables) that explore 
the Domain: Global Cognitive Efficiency, and (ii) to scan the entire set of related 
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Scores, while filtering those which have a value less than a cut-off value (the latter is 
provided by the user and is Instrument and research study dependent). Secondly,
images of the patient are retrieved and a specific computational anatomy pipeline is 
processed to quantify the possible GM volume loss in temporal lobes in the selected 
images.
The definition of the present core ontology was based on the detailed examination 
of the common instruments routinely used in three neurology hospital departments in 
France. We consider this set of instruments as representative of the minimal core that 
core ontology should support via dedicated sub-ontologies.
Two important modeling choices should be emphasized. The first one concerns the 
conceptualization of Instruments and the fact that we chose to model specific 
standard Instruments (e.g. MMS, WMS-III) as classes and not instances. The reason 
is that, in some centers, administered Instruments do not strictly conform to the 
defined standard. To account for these variations, local Instruments are modeled as 
instances of classes, with the latter representing shared properties of standard 
Instruments. Such properties correspond to structural and functional properties 
presented in Section 2.2. As a consequence, our core ontology is specialized by sub-
ontologies, each accounting for a specific Instrument. In some cases, however, 
variations become so important that this modeling is no longer adequate. A new 
standard is then built as a version of a previous one. Such a versioning relation is 
introduced between the two standards so that we can maintain the class/instances 
representation. The second modeling choice concerns the distinction between 
Variable values and Scores. As we have seen, the former are modeled as 
Propositions (referring to an abstract Subject) which pertain to the definition of 
Instrument, whereas the latter (referring to a particular Subject) are the result of 
an Assessment. We therefore have two different propositional contents which are 
linked by a specialization relation (thanks to this relation, information about Score 
codes is only attached to Variable values). It is important to note that Scores are 
moreover characteristic of Assessments (i.e. two Assessments do not share the 
same Score). This choice enlarges our model with a greater number of instances. 
However, when requesting to a given a Score, we directly obtain its specific context 
(Subject, Examination and Study).
4. Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper, we have proposed a core ontology of instruments which builds upon a 
conceptual framework comprising the foundational ontology DOLCE and a recently 
designed ontology of artefacts. Thanks to this building approach and the possibilities of 
mapping it offers with other biomedical ontologies (such as those based on BFO
6
Before it can be used, our core ontology must be complemented with ontologies 
modeling the actually shared Instruments (more precisely the common properties of 
shared Instruments, as stressed earlier). This work is in progress. Once these 
ontologies available, the next step will consist in aligning the different Instruments’
), we
would like to stress its potential interest as a semantic reference for various 
neurosciences applications.
6
http://www.ifomis.org/bfo
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instantiations (at the different clinical sites) to a common reference, thanks to the 
mediator used in the NeuroLOG system (Data Federator, SAP). This will enable to 
query the actual Subjects’ Scores and to correlate such Scores with image findings, 
which is what the end-users are primarily interested in. A current limitation of our 
conceptualization of Instruments lies in our preliminary description of the Domains
and Qualities respectively explored and measured by Instrument variables.
Such Domains and Qualities are modeled as independent concepts, which strongly 
limits the kind of reasoning that can applied. Our intention is to define ontologies of 
brain functions and states, as well as ontologies of the Qualities that may be 
measured during Instrument-based assessments, that will certainly lead to 
enhanced querying and reasoning capabilities.
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